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Nosocomial infections are a common problem in hospitals,
particularly in the intensive care unit (ICU) [1]. They are
associated with increased morbidity and mortality, and are
responsible for considerable costs. Infections with organisms
that are resistant to antimicrobial agents, such as methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), are a particular
problem because of the reduced therapeutic options
associated with such infections. Development of any
nosocomial infection, but perhaps particularly those caused
by resistant organisms such as MRSA, may have medicolegal
implications because many are transmitted by staff from one
patient to another.
Data strongly suggest that infection control measures such as
hand hygiene and patient isolation can prevent the spread of
MRSA [2]. Could failure to adhere to such protocols be
interpreted as medical negligence? Perhaps but, in defence, it
is well accepted that controlling the spread of nosocomial
infections is rarely dependent on any one factor but rather on a
‘package’ of surveillance and preventative measures [3].
Pointing the finger of blame at any single individual or infection
control strategy, or even groups of them, is unrealistic. Poor
catheter insertion practices may contribute to the development
of a nosocomial infection, but many other factors influence a
patient’s likelihood of developing an infection, including their
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Abstract
An elderly patient dies from septic shock in the intensive care unit. This is perhaps not an unusual
scenario, but in this case the sepsis happens to have been due to methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus, possibly related to a catheter, and possibly transmitted from a patient in a neighbouring room by
less than adequate compliance with infection control procedures. The family decides to sue. We present
how experts from four different countries assess the medicolegal issues involved in this case.
Keywords infection control procedures, medicolegal, MRSA, transmission
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severity of illness, duration of ICU stay, previous medications
and comorbid diseases, among others.
There are still many unanswered questions, partly because of
inadequate surveillance and reporting in the past and the poor
methodological quality of many of the studies conducted in
this field [2]. Why does one patient develop MRSA sepsis but
not the next? If staff and patients were routinely screened for
MRSA, then would this make a difference to infection rates?
Would prophylactic antibiotic therapy in high-risk patients
make any difference to infection rates? Establishing causality
is difficult; certainly nobody is perfect, but how ‘perfect’ or
‘imperfect’ can physicians and other staff be expected, or
allowed, to be? Everyone misses the occasional opportunity
to wash his or her hands when leaving a patient, perhaps
when they have to run to the next emergency, but how many
missed occasions can be considered acceptable? These
complex issues are explored here as experts from four
countries provide us with their views on a hypothetical, but
increasingly common, clinical scenario.
The Case
An elderly patient dies from septic shock on the ICU at your
hospital. He had been admitted for subarachnoid
haemorrhage 2 weeks earlier and had never woken up,
although nobody had raised the issue of withdrawal of life
support. The patient’s children overhear that the fatal
infection had been due to a multiresistant staphylococcus
called MRSA and may have been catheter-related. They now
say that they remember having seen a nurse leaving the next
patient, who was infected with that pathogen (it was written
in red on the door), and then entering their father’s room
without washing her hands. They remember having seen
another nurse briefly enter the next patient’s room without
wearing a gown, although this was clearly stated as a
requirement in the infection control procedure noted on the
door. They also wonder whether their father really needed the
catheter that caused the infection. Accordingly, the children
decide that the ICU-acquired infection that took their father is
your mistake and decide to sue you! What would you do to
defend your case and your team?
An American opinion
Michael Neiderman
In defending the ICU team and in explaining the situation to
the family in this scenario, several considerations are
important. First, the possibility that staff transmitted MRSA to
the family member is real, but the benefit of barrier and
contact precautions to prevent this problem is quite unclear
[4]. In addition, the major determinant of acquisition of line
infection is the meticulousness of the procedure used for
insertion of the line itself [5]. Thus, we would need to know
(and reassure the family, depending on the answers) whether
the physician inserting the line used a sterile gown and mask,
whether the catheter used was antibiotic coated, what site
the line was placed in and how easily the line was inserted. It
would also be important to explain to the family why central
lines are so commonly used in ICUs and why this patient
required one.
The most important issue that the family needs to understand
is that the development of a nosocomial infection is often a
reflection of the severity of a patient’s illness, which relates to
impaired host defences. The use of ‘barrier precautions’ such
as gowns and gloves, although valuable, may not always be
effective. This is especially true in an ICU with a high
background rate of resistant pathogens, or in one that is
plagued by the importation of community-acquired MRSA,
brought in by staff, visitors and the patient themselves, in
some instances making infection control ineffective [4].
The value of barrier precautions has been proven for MRSA,
but not all of the data are clearly positive. The recommended
policies for prevention have changed over the years, and
even with the use of private rooms, gowns, gloves, masks
and hand washing (after removing gloves and leaving the
room), which became a formal recommendation of the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 1996, the
proportion of ICU infections due to MRSA increased from
36% to 57% between 1996 and 2002 [4]. The failure of
such ‘contact precautions’ may be due to multiple factors. As
mentioned above, if the background rate of resistance in the
ICU is already high, then the efficacy of these measures may
be limited. In one study the use of a multifaceted programme
did work, but the incidence of MRSA was still relatively high,
at 0.24/100 admissions, as compared with a rate of 0.6/100
admissions before the use of these measures [6]. Contact
precautions may also fail when there are high rates of
community MRSA entering the ICU, regardless of
precautions.
The behaviour of the staff in the care of the patient in our
case scenario is not unusual. In fact, in 34 published studies
the average adherence of health care workers to hand
washing was 40%, with a range of 5–81% [4].
Because the risks for developing MRSA infection from a
central venous catheter are often dependent on patient
factors as well as on the behaviour of health care workers,
underlying comorbidities such as diabetes can increase the
risk, as can the presence of more severe illness (i.e. a high
Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II score).7
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A French opinion
Christian Brun-Buisson
There are at least two questions raised by this case history
within the context of legal action against the unit. The first
question is a juridical one; can the death of this patient be
ascribed to the MRSA infection? Second, were infection
control procedures adequate and could this event have been
avoided? A further question that one could add is how could
this legal action have been avoided?
The first question seems to be a relatively easy one to
answer. Although we are not told the patient’s age, cerebral
computed tomography, or magnetic resonance imaging
findings, let us assume that the subarachnoidal haemorrhage
had caused irreversible lesions that were responsible for
prolonged coma and lack of arousal. In this setting, it is
unlikely that a judicial review would conclude that the
infection was responsible for the death of the patient, or that
the infection altered substantially the natural course of events
in this patient. It is therefore unlikely that the plaintiffs would
be granted an action based on a (involuntary) homicide.
Whether adequate organization for infection control was in
place also appears clear because patients carrying MRSA
were subject to isolation procedures. The ICU must provide
evidence that isolation procedures were implemented in
accordance with guidelines and with the recommendations of
infection control committees [8]. The literature indicates that
absolute compliance with isolation precautions is not the
rule. What would be useful is to have data available that
show that compliance in the unit (e.g. with hand washing)
was at least as good (and preferably higher) than the 50%
rate reported in the literature [9]. It might be useful to remind
the judge that compliance in busy units might decrease with
increased workload, and there are times when the workload
is so high that breaches in control measures inevitably occur.
Data regarding the actual nurse/patient ratio during the
patient’s stay might be useful, because absolute compliance
can be expected when this ratio is close to 1. Caring for two
or more patients in emergency situations cannot be expected
to be associated with absolute compliance with hand
washing precautions. The patient’s family refer to an incident
in which a member of the nursing staff failed to wash their
hands after attending to a patient with MRSA, but was this an
emergency situation?
As with infection itself, it is probably better to prevent
complaints than treat them. Explaining to families that
nosocomial infections do occur in ICUs, why they occur
(especially in long-term ventilated patients), and all that is
done to control and contain these infections (in accordance
with published and local guidelines) is probably one way to
avoid complaints. In this regard, it is somewhat surprising
that therapeutic plans and the possibility of withdrawal of life
support had not been discussed beforehand with the
patient’s family [10]. This discussion would also have been
an opportunity to discuss the potential risks associated with
a prolonged ICU stay.
A Swiss opinion
Christian Haenni, Stephan Harbarth and Dominique Sprumont
Under Swiss law, if one wishes to demonstrate liability of the
hospital or the health care providers, then several elements
must be proven [11]. First, one must demonstrate the
existence of damage, in this case the death of the patient.
Second, there must be evidence of an act of negligence
based on a departure from ‘state of the art’ practice. The
negligence could manifest as the act of an individual member
of the hospital personnel (e.g. systematic lack of hand
hygiene) or as a failure in the organization of the hospital
system (e.g. absence of infection control policies). Third, a
causal link must be established between the alleged damage
and the act of negligence. According to real life experience,
there should be a high degree of certainty that the act of
negligence was indeed the origin of the damage. Swiss law
makes it rather difficult for patients to sue physicians or
nurses (and the hospital where they work) for suspected
negligence, as long as they adhere to at least a minimum
standard of professional behaviour [12].
Liability could also be concluded if there was a lack of
informed consent [13]. However, because this appears to
have been a true emergency situation, the physicians were
However, the impact these conditions have can be minimized
if efforts are made to insert the line under carefully controlled
and sterile conditions [7]. If these procedures were followed
in our hypothetical case, then the impact of breaches in
contact precautions by the nursing staff may have been
minimal.
In summary, nosocomial infections can be serious and often
devastating complications of critical illness, but their
presence does not always indicate poor medical care. Many
factors other than breaches in infection control and ‘contact
precautions’ might have been important here, and if other
factors are considered then the role played by these
breaches in causing infection might have been negligible.
Prevention of infection requires a combination of good care
at many stages, a patient who has an underlying illness that
responds quickly to therapy, minimizing exposure to invasive
devices, and the hospital environment.8
Critical Care    February 2005 Vol 9 No 1 Vincent et al.
entitled to believe that the patient would have agreed to be
treated, despite the potential risk for nosocomial infection. This
may be considered ‘hypothetical consent’. Even if the patient
had been conscious and the situation had not been life
threatening, it remains to be proven that, being informed of the
risk for nosocomial infection, he would have refused treatment.
This is rather unlikely in view of the risks to the patient.
One last and difficult issue is the right of the children to be
informed of their father’s cause of death. One could argue
that they are entitled to know whether it was a
microbiologically proven, hospital-acquired MRSA infection
or another fatal infection that caused the death of their father.
One precondition would be that it is a common policy of the
hospital to provide general information on nosocomial
infections and to make the patients aware of the potential
risks [13]. It is our understanding that a clear policy on this
issue is useful both for hospital personnel and patients
because it encourages transparency [14]. In the present
case it could have helped to prevent legal action.
Certainly, if we are to defend the hospital and the ICU
personnel, then we must take seriously the observations of
the children about the way in which their father was cared
for. The main issue is to clarify the facts. This will prove
useful when discussing the situation with the plaintiffs but
also when assessing the legal merits of the case. In this
context, we would ask the ICU personnel about their own
perception of the case and ask for the patient’s medical
record. We would also organize a meeting with the children
to give them an opportunity to express their feelings and
provide them with as much information as possible. Many
complaints are based on misconceptions and poor
communication between the parties involved. It is therefore
worth being open to criticism and complaint from the
relatives in order to prevent further legal action. In the
present case, however, it appears difficult to concede
liability of the ICU personnel, especially if there was a clear
policy on the information provided to the patients about the
risks of hospital-acquired infection.
A Spanish opinion
Mauricio Valencia and Antoni Torres
We must address several key issues with respect to this
clinical case. First, did this patient need a central venous
catheter? The patient’s diagnosis was a subarachnoid
haemorrhage. Because he did not regain consciousness
during the 2-week period he was in the ICU, it may be that
the the haemorrhage was rather severe [15]. In current
clinical practice, angiographic and symptomatic cerebral
vasospasm is recognized as the main cause of substantial
disability and death in patients with subarachnoid haemor-
rhage. Cerebral vasospasm kills 7% of patients and causes
severe deficit in a further 7% [16]. Management of this
complication, alongside nimodipine, is the so-called ‘triple H’
therapy, which consists of hypervolaemia, induced arterial
hypertension and haemodilution. Monitoring during this
therapy with a central venous catheter (or even a pulmonary
artery catheter) is mandatory [17].
With respect to the catheter-related bloodstream infection with
MRSA, several points must be considered. Although another
patient in the ICU was infected with MRSA, this does not
render it irrefutable that our patient was infected from this
source. Patients can be colonized with MRSA on admission to
the ICU. In one study [18] 6.8% of patients were colonized on
ICU admission. In addition, in a case–control study as many as
58% of 170 MRSA isolates in a hospital were from community
cases [19]. MRSA colonization greatly increases the risk for
S aureus infection (hazard ratio 3.84; P = 0.0003) [20], but
the scenario presented above does not state whether our
patient was colonized with the strain from the infected patient.
The strains from both patients should be characterized by
pulsed field gel electrophoresis of whole cell DNA, and that
information would confirm the origin of the strain [19].
This patient had several important risk factors for nosocomial
MRSA infection in the acute care setting. These risk factors
are prolonged hospital stay, exposure to broad-spectrum
antibiotics, lengthy duration of antimicrobial therapy,
prolonged stay in intensive care unit, presence of a surgical
wound and proximity to another patient with MRSA [21].
The noncompliance of the staff with isolation measures in the
ICU is a further risk factor for spread of MRSA. The US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention advocate
contact isolation precautions to prevent spread of MRSA
[22], although some investigators claim that contact isolation
precautions alone did not control nosocomial spread of
MRSA in their institutions [23]. There are many reports of
successful control of MRSA spread with the use of contact
or barrier precautions [24,25], and this practice must be
reinforced.
In conclusion, the ICU staff made important mistakes in their
implementation of isolation precautions. The noncompliant
behaviour is itself a risk factor for MRSA spread. However,
we cannot conclude that there is a causal link between the
faults of the staff and the patient’s death.
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